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Abstract 
 
 
 
In recent decades, there has been an avalanche of numbers in public life, one that 
matches that which occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century.  The difference 
today is that many of the numbers that are now so central to political rule pertain to 
performance, and depend on a felicitous interlocking of quantifying, economising, 
and marketising.  The calculated management of life is at a critical juncture, and it is 
essential that we consider carefully how this is affecting who we are, what we have 
become, and who we wish to be.  Only a few decades ago, this bandwagon seemed 
limited or at least focused in its reach, yet it now appears as if no domain of human 
endeavour can escape.  We argue that it is important to differentiate quantifying, 
economising, and marketising, so as to counter the often phobic response to the 
unrelenting march of numbers in modern political rule.  We call for greater attention 
to the role of accounting numbers, for accounting numbers go beyond the abstract 
models of economics and allow a form of action on the actions of others that 
economics does not.  We argue also for greater attention to the conditionality of the 
performativity of quantification, so that we can identify the conditions under which 
numbers produce effects, and the varying nature and extent of those effects.  Finally, 
we consider the thorny issue of “democratising” the social sphere, and note that it is 
only recently that quantification has been largely annexed by the phenomenon dubbed 
neoliberalism. 
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On 24 April 2007, the Daily Telegraph published Dr Foster’s Good Hospital Guide.  
The article summarising the results was titled “Lottery of death rates in hospitals”.  It 
came as a surprise to the Mid Staffordshire Hospital Trust that its Hospital 
Standardised Mortality Ratio was 127, as opposed to 114 which it had been led to 
expect, and that it was ranked the fourth worst performing trust in the country on this 
metric.  The Trust was also shown to be the fourth worst performing trust in the 
country over a three-year period, with a score of 125.  Much debate ensued in the 
media, in learned journals, within the hospital itself, between the hospital and its 
regulators, and with the provider of the data.  This focused on the robustness of the 
results, the intricacies of the HSMR methodology, issues of coding, and the possible 
link between poor results and patient care.  Notwithstanding these debates, mortality 
rates figured prominently in the various investigations concerning Mid Staffordshire 
Hospital Trust, and merited an entire chapter in the almost 1800-page Report of the 
Public Inquiry that was published in February 2013. 
 
On Sunday 1 April 1990, a riot broke out at Strangeways prison in Manchester.  Two 
people died and hundreds were injured during the ensuing 25-day protest against the 
Victorian jail's squalid conditions and overcrowding.  Riots broke out at other prisons 
over the following weekend.  On 6 April 1990, the then Home Secretary appointed 
Lord Justice Woolf to head an Inquiry into the disturbances and to consider the wider 
implications for the prison system.  Ten months later the Woolf Report was produced, 
a 600-page document called the most significant analysis of the penal system in a 
hundred years.  That report recommended the introduction of a set of Accredited 
Standards regarding the physical conditions in which prisoners are to be held as well 
as the activities and support available.  One of its twelve key recommendations 
pertained to overcrowding, and stipulated that no establishment should hold more 
prisoners than is allowed for in its ‘certified normal level of accommodation’.  Three 
years later, a new Director General of the Prison Service was appointed, who had 
previously been the Chief Executive of Granada Television and a Controller at the 
Ford Motor Company.  In the same year, a standardised system of performance 
measurement was introduced into the Prison Service.  By 1995, the number of prison 
key performance indicators (KPIs) had rapidly increased. 
  
 
 
The powers of quantification 
 
If the state has been viewed as the “coldest of all cold monsters”, then quantification in all its 
various forms comes a close second for some.  Yet a phobic response to the unrelenting 
march of numbers in modern political rule will blunt our capacity for analysis and critique, 
just as surely as denouncing the evils of capitalism, mass society, or globalisation (Gordon, 
2014; Rose, 1991).  It is important to differentiate the various types of numbers at play in 
contemporary democratic societies, the differential uses to which they may be put, and the 
differential implications for their putative democratising of the social sphere.  To take just the 
two examples above, in the first case numbers produced by a commercial organisation give 
rise to or fuel a major public controversy concerning care quality, and the extent to which 
mortality statistics in all their various permutations may highlight poor care.  In the second 
case, a public scandal gives rise to a call for standards and numbers, in order to balance the 
requirements of security, control, and justice.  There are many more modalities of 
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quantification, particularly when economization and marketization enter the picture.  It is this 
variation that needs attention if we are to inventorise our present in terms of the linkage 
between modes of being and modes of governing public spaces.  There is little point in 
considering quantification separately from the objects and subjects to be governed through 
such means. 
 
Quantification, of course, is not new.  Charles Babbage’s call in 1832 for a list of all the facts 
that could be expressed as numbers exemplifies the “avalanche of numbers” (Hacking, 1990) 
that occurred between 1820 and 1840.  We may smile today at his proposed list, which 
included not only atomic weights, specific heats, but also the number of feet of oak a man can 
saw in an hour, the volume of air needed to keep a person alive for an hour, the relative 
weights of the bones of various species, and so on.  Almost two centuries earlier, the Colbert 
era exhibits an earlier attempt to govern a nation by numbers and information (Miller, 1990).  
But something has happened across the past three decades or so which has changed the role 
of numbers in modes of governing.  We no longer inhabit Babbage’s world with its dream of 
ascertaining “the constants of nature and art”.  Numbers, and particularly those that can be 
expressed in economic or financial terms, have come to be endowed with a form of truth that 
has the authority to guide or govern us, to shape and influence who we are, or who we should 
try to become.  This is even more so when such numbers are vested with the often 
meretricious authority of markets.  It is the felicitous yet variable interlocking of quantifying, 
economising, and marketising that we need to be attentive to if we are to identify the 
individuality of our present. 
 
The range and diversity of the numbers surrounding us can astound even those familiar with 
the phenomenon.  Only a few decades ago, this quantifying bandwagon seemed limited or at 
least focused in its reach, yet it now appears as if no domain of human endeavour can escape.  
Mortality statistics and performance data for prisons are just two examples of a vast new 
territory that has been opened up for and by quantification.  Once opened up, the numbers 
proliferate, chains of calculations form, and things become ever more complex.  As Robert 
Musil so aptly put it, the experts never get to the end of anything (Musil, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 
254). For the dipsomaniac whose tipple is numbers, only more numbers will suffice. 
 
Some might think, for instance, that mortality statistics for hospitals would be simply about 
the number of people that die in hospital.  But things are never that simple when the 
quantifiers get their hands on something.  The Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio 
(HSMR) is a method of seeking to establish whether hospital mortality is higher or lower 
than expected. It compares the levels of deaths of patients in hospitals in different years, or 
between different groups of patients/ailments in the same year.  To allow comparisons 
between different hospitals, the method of calculating HSMR takes account of differences in 
case mix, and makes adjustments for variables that are not directly related to the quality of 
treatment and care provided in a particular hospital.  The variables for which adjustments are 
made include: age, ethnicity, admission source and type, level of deprivation, period of 
admission, and co-morbidity. HSMR are also calculated by reference to the 56 diagnostic 
groups which between them are said to account for 80% of all hospital deaths.  Currently, the 
figures are also adjusted according to whether or not palliative care was provided.  The 
HSMR is calculated by dividing the number of deaths that actually occurred by the number of 
expected deaths, multiplied by 100.  The national mortality baseline is therefore 100.  If the 
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mortality levels are higher than expected, the result will be more than 100; if less than 
expected, it will be less than 100.3  
 
The same holds for performance figures for prisons. In 1990, at the time of the riots 
mentioned above, there were virtually no numbers that could be appealed to as a way of 
demonstrating the relative performance of individual prisons.  Today, and in the wake of a 
partial privatisation of the UK penal system, there are more than a dozen.  Currently, and in 
addition to data on overcrowding, these include: public protection measures (measured for 
example in number of prisoner escapes), Offending Behaviour Programme (OBP) 
completions, OBP starts, number of completed drug rehabilitation programmes, drug testing 
results, self-harm audits, assault data, data on employment and accommodation of prisoners 
upon release, hours of work in prison industry, staff sickness, race equality data, and costs per 
prisoner place.4 They also contain measures of prisoner experience aimed at capturing the 
“quality of prison life” (Liebling, 2004). These measures are based on a questionnaire survey 
of prisoners’ perceptions to gauge “the quality of the social culture and other aspects of 
prison life” that are difficult to define and measure by other means.5  Such data is collected 
from the prisoners to capture in a systematic, comparable manner information about the 
quality of the relationships prisoners form, and levels of professionalism, safety and security 
as perceived by them. 
 
This avalanche of numbers pertaining to performance across the past three decades or so is 
often justified in terms of consumer choice, as if the choice of a restaurant, a school, or a 
residential care home were somehow equivalent. 6  Today, the avalanche is more or less 
immediate, with internet feedback and social media providing almost real-time assessments, 
regardless of their accuracy.  But even when the language of choice encounters fundamental 
limits, as in the case of prisons, or is attenuated as in the case of residential care homes, 
rankings and ratings are still called upon to allow performance to be assessed.  The language 
of markets here justifies comparisons between private prisons and those owned and managed 
by the government.  Since 2003, prisons in England and Wales have been rated on a scale 
from 1 to 4, where 4 stands for exceptional performance and 1 indicates that overall 
performance is of serious concern. Although originally developed with input from 
management consultants (Mennicken, 2013), the current prison rating system, which was 
introduced in 2009, is a joint product of the Cambridge University Prisons Research Centre, 
the Criminal Justice Group (CJG) of the Ministry of Justice, and the National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS). The rating system is based on a plethora of different 
measures aimed at reflecting performance in: Public Protection, Reducing Reoffending, 
Decency, and Resource Management and Operational Effectiveness.7 The measures are 
added up following an elaborate weighting system that accounts for differential prison types 
and seeks to balance conflicting prison objectives, such as those of security, rehabilitation, 
efficiency, economy and decency. 
 
                                                 
3 HC898-1, Mid-staffs Frances Report, Vol. I, p.416, paras 5.20 and 5.22.  
4 See for example the 2014-15 specifications of the prison rating system (PRS) and PRS dataset. 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/prison-and-probation-performance-statistics-2014-to-2015, accessed 
11 May 2016).  
5 See for instance the 2014-15 PRS specifications. 
6 See http://www.nhs.uk/Service-Search/Care-homes-and-care-at-home/LocationSearch/11, accessed 15 May 
2016. 
7 See the 2014-15 PRS specifications. 
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Aimed at exacting responsibility and following ideals of total, finely calibrated control, this 
system does not, however, encompass all dimensions of quantified prison performance. The 
reduction of re-offending constitutes for example a performance objective that challenges 
organisational accounting entity assumptions, not least because of the frequent movement of 
prisoners between prisons, which makes it very difficult to attribute re-offending rates to the 
performance of individual prison entities. Other measures are deliberately excluded from the 
rating system, such as data about self-inflicted deaths or complaints. Such data is collected, 
but not used in the calculation of overall prison performance. 
 
Further, we ought to pay attention to the varying degrees of malleability of numbers. 
Whereas the counting of prisoner escapes is one of the least controversial of all the numbers 
gathered about prisons (at least at the measurement level), the situation is very different in the 
case of hospital mortality ratios (see the debates around HSMR methodology referred to 
above) and the measurement of prison overcrowding. For instance, the Prison Service in 
England and Wales distinguishes between Certified Normal Accommodation (CNA, defining 
how many persons prisons should be expected to hold) and Operational Capacity (Op Cap, 
defining how many persons prisons can hold, in principle safely and decently) (Bastow, 
2013). Both measures are highly malleable and controversial. At what point does 
overcrowding start, or “crowding” as it is now euphemistically termed? What is “normal” 
capacity (ibid., Ch. 4)? Definitions of what counts as “too crowded” or “not crowded” have 
shifted over time, and particularly changes in Op Cap definitions were used by the 
government as a basis for rationalizing and justifying stretch in capacity of the system, which 
has given rise to much debate (ibid.). Quantification can also be less visible, as is the case 
with the complex economic models and cost calculations that drive resource allocations and 
rationing for healthcare, social care, education, the penal sector, and much more besides. This 
diversity in modalities of quantification is lost when it is cast uniformly in dystopian or at 
least gloomy terms, even if there is good reason in many cases to be gloomy (see e.g. Brown, 
2015; Supiot, 2015). 
 
And then there is the matter of amnesia.  We need to remember that it is not only those 
reforms dubbed neoliberal that have called for greater accountability and transparency.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, calls for greater accountability and voice came equally from civil 
libertarians, feminists, radicals, socialists and others (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 201).  Put 
more generally, instruments of quantification are also integral to how democracy is justified 
and operationalized as a particular set of mechanisms of rule (Desrosières, 1998; Porter, 
1995; Rose, 1991). At least some of the devices that increasingly seek to quantify 
performance in contemporary societies had a “democratising” ambition at their inception, an 
aspiration to hold managers, public administrators, and civil servants to account, so as to 
counteract nepotism and arbitrariness. And, as Mary Morgan has pointed out, we should not 
ignore the continuing importance of the voicing of the facts of experience, derived from the 
rights of citizens to use their own experience to argue about things that matter to them or 
those close to them (Morgan, 2010).  The active citizen, free to choose and equipped with 
mechanisms to enable such choices, may appear today to be coterminous with neoliberalism, 
but that apparent coterminosity is a very recent invention. We argue here that it is our job to 
analyse such developments, so that we may get to grips better with a phenomenon that has 
embedded itself at the heart of contemporary political culture.  With this in mind, we offer a 
set of propositions which we hope will inspire debate, even if some of that debate is 
discomforting. 
 
 
 5
Quantifying, economising and marketising 
 
Our core argument is that it is important to differentiate quantifying, economising, and 
marketising, so as to better understand what is taking place and why. Why should we bother 
with this differentiation?  Are we just splitting hairs, since neoliberalism manages to link or 
fuse these three components into an apparently harmonious whole?  We think not, but we 
owe it to the reader to offer a brief explanation. 
 
Quantification should be the easiest of the triptych to define, for it is, at first sight, a matter 
simply of numbers (counting and measuring):  the number of births, the number of deaths, the 
number of suicides, the number of burglaries committed, the number of migrants, the number 
of unemployed, the number of prisoners reoffending, even the numbers Babbage called for, 
such as the frequency of occurrence of the various letters of the alphabet in different 
languages!  But the apparent simplicity of numbers is misleading.  For it is not just numbers 
that matter, it is numbers that are accorded objectivity, something that Daston and Galison 
(2007) date as having occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century.  What matters is that 
moment when objectivity is attached to numbers, and when that objectivity becomes 
ubiquitous and irresistible.  What matters is that moment when numbers oust judgment, or at 
least marginalise it or limit its operation to specific domains, even if the rivalry persists in 
some domains a century and a half later.  As the physicist Lord Kelvin put it at the end of the 
nineteenth century, “when you can measure what you are speaking about, you know 
something about it; when you cannot measure it…your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind” (quoted in Hacking, 1991, p. 186).   It is this fusion of numbers and 
objectivity that matters, something that has been with us for over a century and a half, and 
which has been fundamental to state-building and the administration of territories (Porter, 
1995). Quantification involves a transformation of quality into quantity, of subjective 
experience into objectified knowledge. In so doing, it prepares the ground for new 
possibilities of governing. But we need to be careful to separate quantification from 
economisation, for not all quantification implies economisation.  Consider, for example, 
opinion polls, medical statistics, the quantitative study of crimes, surveys of patient and 
prisoner experience, and much else besides.  
 
Economising has its own history.  Like numbers, which one can trace back as far in time as 
one likes, economising can be found in the distant mists of time if one wishes to search for it 
there.  But here again we counsel against taking economising as self-evident and constant 
over time.  By economising, we mean the ideas and instruments through which individuals, 
activities, organizations, nation states, regions, projects, and much else besides are 
constituted as economic actors and entities (Miller and Power, 2013), a definition that has 
much in common with the definition proposed by Michel Callon and his colleagues (see e.g. 
Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; but see also Muniesa, 2014). But we mean more than just the 
formatting of the economy by economics, and related disciplines. And we mean more than 
just the discursive process of constituting the economy as a terrain distinct from the polity, 
even though that longer process is a necessary prerequisite for more recent developments.  
Our concern here is more specific, it is with the links between economising and governing, 
the governing of souls, children and households, of doctors, prison managers and teachers, 
social workers and the retired.  Economising is of interest not just because it is performative, 
but because it is tied to particular modes of governing, particular modes of being. 
 
Economising in this sense has many components. It implies a concern with the idea of 
efficiency – governing aimed at enhancing individual or collective performance, the 
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reduction of wastefulness, and the imposition of rationing through calculation. Economising 
is further about making comparable things that are not yet comparable (such as universities, 
schools, or restaurants) by distilling different things (labour, knowledge, materials) into a 
single financial figure (take the example of cost-benefit analyses, value for money, return on 
investment as well as net present value calculations). Economising in financial terms makes 
comparable activities and processes whose physical characteristics may bear no resemblance 
whatsoever, and in so doing allows notions of competition and benchmarking to gain traction.  
If the return on investment of a particular investment is above the hurdle rate (say 20%), one 
need not in principle even bother to ask what the investment is.  The same holds for an 
investment with a positive net present value. 
 
Accounting has a special role to play here. For accounting goes beyond the abstract models 
of economics. It represents a particular variant of economisation that has received insufficient 
attention outside the discipline of accounting. Accounting is able to interfere, to act on the 
actions of teachers, social workers, doctors and many others in a way that economics is not, 
through performance measurement, return on investment calculations, standard costing, value 
for money calculations, and the like. Economising in this sense emerged in the early 
twentieth century, long after the advent of quantifying, and even half a century after 
quantifying came to be linked to the notion of objectivity.  Economising as a mode of 
governing, as a mode of acting on the actions of managers and workers, began with the 
advent of standard costing and related normalising and standardising programmes.  It has 
gone through various mutations since, as particular calculative devices have been attached to 
particular programmes or rationalities of governing. 
 
To illustrate from our present, we have to go beyond the two examples we cited at the outset. 
For instance, the publishing of the National Reference Cost Index for NHS hospitals was held 
out as a way of making different hospitals comparable, something that had long been claimed 
to be impossible due to hospitals all being different because of their different casemix. With 
this step, hospital managers, and even the managers of particular departments or specialisms 
within hospitals could be governed in terms of their relative efficiency.  To remain with this 
example, “Reference Costs”, a particular form of standard costs, were initially introduced as 
a way of benchmarking the cost of individual medical treatments, so as to drive down unit 
costs and, ironically, the bureaucratic cost of internal markets.  But they soon came to be 
hitched up to a volume driven resource allocation mechanism through which hospitals are 
reimbursed at national average cost (The Department of Health, 1997).  Economising in this 
sense not only formats the hospital as an economic entity, it also provides a visibility and a 
means of governing the key actors within individual hospitals. 
 
Marketising is altogether different, even if it can be found at times comfortably co-existing 
alongside economising.  As others have argued, it can be regarded as a specific form of 
economising, yet we need to be clear that one can economise a domain without marketising it 
(take the example of Soviet economic planning).  Installing elaborate cost models and cost 
allocations so as to instantiate the idea of efficiency at the heart of hospital care, and using 
those models to allocate resources, has little to do with marketising, even if the idea of 
competition lurks in the background.  Once again, our interest in marketising is in terms of 
modes of governing, and the injunction to not govern too much – “to coordinate social 
activity without [much, added] intervention by political authorities or ‘conscious’ cooperation 
by actors themselves” (Davies, 2014, p. 2). This applies of course to the existing economic 
terrain, and the incessant pressure to instantiate competition while supporting the market 
through a set of state interventions.  But our concern here is particularly to do with the still 
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growing attempts to extend the rationality of the market to domains previously viewed as 
non-market and non-economic, and the transformation, as Foucault put it, “from a market 
supervised by the state to a state under the supervision of the market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 
116). Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this is the attempt to embed corporate 
bankruptcy regimes in the UK hospital sector, on the grounds that one cannot properly 
marketise a domain without putting in place relatively orderly mechanisms for exit. 
 
Why does it matter to differentiate quantifying, economising, and marketising?  It matters 
because of the need to counter the phobia of modes of governing, and the debilitating effects 
of such phobias for analysis and critique.  It matters because we need to understand how 
modes of governing operate.  For three decades or so, we have lived in a world where 
injunctions to citizens to observe the realities and disciplines of the market, and invocations 
to think of oneself as an enterprising self, have achieved a sort of pedagogical ascendancy.  
Yet much of what happens under the guise of the so-called new public management reforms 
has more in common with a centralised command and control resource allocation mechanism 
driven by considerations of volume and efficiency rather than the logic of markets and the 
category of the entrepreneurial self.  Likewise with the prison ratings referred to above, 
which are composed of a multiplicity of different chains of calculations and underlying sets 
of calculative expertise, ranging from actuarial and quasi-actuarial methods in offender risk 
assessments, techniques of standard costing in cost per prisoner place calculations, to a 
questionnaire for prisoners which has been developed inductively based on the principles of 
Appreciative Inquiry. We need to disentangle such multiplicities, rather than assume 
equivalence when it is absent.  Equally, we need to be attentive to when numbers are taken 
notice of, and when they are conveniently ignored.  For instance, the “certified normal level 
of accommodation” figures for prisons may be ignored in the interests of cramming more 
prisoners into already overcrowded prisons.  Likewise with the mortality figures at the Mid 
Staffordshire hospital, at least initially.  At times, one wishes that quantification would be 
more performative than it seems to be.   
 
 
Quantifying, mediating and democratising 
 
Calls for greater accountability and transparency through quantification have today been 
largely annexed by the phenomenon dubbed neoliberalism.  But, as already noted, not long 
ago such calls were the battle cry for socialists, feminists, libertarians and others. As Hacking 
reminds us, statistical data have a certain superficial neutrality between ideologies, and no 
one used the facts collected by the factory inspectors more vigorously than Marx (Hacking, 
1991, p. 184). Enthusiasm for figures is not only rooted in the promises they hold for 
economic rationalization. Equally important are the dreams and schemes of alternative forms 
of governing, of doing things differently with numbers. What implications does this have for 
our interest in the democratising of the social sphere? 
 
It is important not to start from a presumption that quantification is necessarily evil in and of 
itself, even if it may be intrinsically dangerous (Foucault, 1983).8  Indeed, it is the very 
“coldness” of numbers, their apparent objectivity, which is so cherished by those that trumpet 
their virtues. For it is this quality that allegedly allows rational assessments to be made in 
                                                 
8 The allusion here is to a remark of Foucault’s (1983, pp. 231-2): “My point is not that everything is bad, but 
that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always 
have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism … the ethico-
political choice we have to make … is to determine which is the main danger.” 
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situations previously dominated by emotion, whim, or subjective judgment.  It is this quality 
that supposedly allows the most sensitive and apparently intractable issues to be placed 
beyond the fray of politics. Numbers promise a “de-politicisation” of politics (Rose, 1991). 
They give legitimacy to political power in democracies by producing a public rhetoric of 
disinterest in situations of contestation (ibid.). In ways that echo Hirschman’s (1997 [1977]) 
analysis of the victory of the idea of interests over that of passions several centuries earlier, a 
particular class and usage of numbers has been called upon to play a civilising role in 
contemporary democratic polities. We need to explore how the “coldness” of numbers has 
achieved such a victory in modern government, and with what implications. In this context, 
we also need to learn more about the roles that seemingly mundane and apolitical 
quantification instruments of rating, ranking and performance measurement play in the 
organisation of value conflict and value plurality. In the correctional services, for example, 
psychological expertise might still be valuable but mediated by actuarial and quasi-actuarial 
methods of identifying the dangerous (Simon, 2005). The prison ratings discussed above may 
offer “standardised ways of constructing proxies for uncertain and elusive qualities” 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998). Yet, abstract values, such as those of a prisoner’s dignity and 
decency, are themselves transformed by the conventions of quantification applied to them. 
And it is for us to examine such processes of value reconfiguration and scrutinise the extent 
to which quantification can play the role of a “mediating instrument” (Miller and O'Leary, 
2007) where conflicting values are at stake.  
 
Also, we ought to be mindful about the conditions under which numbers may become “hot” 
again and re-politicised. For numbers can also aid social mobilisation and critical debate, 
even if that might appear a distant aspiration in our present. The legibility and accessibility of 
quantitative data about the performances of states, including mortality statistics, cancer 
survival rates, and other performance data collected in hospitals and prisons, may enable 
watchful vigilance from underneath. Yet, at the same time, what is “behind” the data, how the 
numbers have been produced, is often invisible, so citizens are left conjecturing what has 
been omitted and why. Quantification changes possibilities for democratic participation and 
political engagement. Assessing and critiquing government through numbers, including the 
quality of public services such as healthcare or the correctional services, requires a 
reasonable level of numerical literacy. In this context, it is important to understand what 
forms of political activism have formed in and around quantification. What forms of 
“counter-conduct”, in the sense of struggle against the procedures implemented for 
conducting others (Foucault, 2008), do we find with and around numbers? 
 
In the UK, for example, the Radical Statistics Group, usually abbreviated to Radstats, was 
formed in 1975 as part of the radical science movement “to create awareness of the actual 
and potential misuse of statistics within and outside government.”9 The group still exists 
today seeking to “explore changing features of contemporary economy, society and politics, 
inasmuch as they relate to statistics and data.” 10 The group put together “an unofficial guide” 
to official health statistics which seeks to provide a comprehensive reference source 
describing the statistics which are currently publicly available in the UK, including mortality 
statistics, the strengths and weaknesses of these data sets and the history and politics that 
have produced them.11 The Radstats group is committed “to helping build a more free, 
democratic and egalitarian society” and issued “Statistics for Radical Change”, a practical 
handbook for political and community activists that highlights “the various ways that 
                                                 
9 See www.radstats.org.uk, accessed 17 June 2016. 
10 See http://www.radstats.org.uk/activity/rs2020/, accessed 17 June 2016. 
11 See http://www.radstats.org.uk/no075/tunstall.htm, accessed 17 June 2016. 
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activists can employ data in campaigning, community organising and developing an 
alternative political framework.”12 The Radstats Group and other activists (see here also the 
French works on Statactivsme by Bruno et al., 2014) use numbers as a means of public 
denunciation and criticism. Such activism goes beyond the purely negative act of 
disobedience or resistance. It is productive as it seeks to develop new ways of governing by 
numbers, for example by mapping out spaces for dialogic procedures, promoting new forms 
of subjectivity and collectivity, and challenging posited relationships between fact and value.  
 
Further, we need to attend to the conditionality of the performativity of quantification. Judith 
Butler reminds us that there are strong and weak forms of performativity (Butler, 2010). 
Drawing on Austin, she distinguishes (analytically) between devices that work more or less 
by themselves and that alter or make up the world (“produce ontological effects” as she puts 
it), and perlocutions that require other conditions, including even good luck (a felicitous set 
of circumstances), to have effects. She also points out that most of the performative action in 
the economic sphere belongs to the latter set.  Likewise with quantification more generally.  
Hospital mortality ratios or prison performance ratings, although central to the defining of 
organisational success or failure, do not work all by themselves, but require other discursive 
and non-discursive conditions.  The types of effects they produce are variable, and not in a 
binary sense but along a continuum. These effects may take the form of relatively minor 
adjustments to existing ways of doing things, which in the end have little impact on the 
world.  They may take the form of large-scale reconstructions of domains, entities and 
persons.  And they may take a wide variety of different forms in between.  Such changes may 
happen relatively quickly, across a matter of only years, or they may be slow, with much 
stopping and starting, as was the case with the creation of relatively stable bankruptcy 
legislation in the US and the UK, which took virtually the whole of the nineteenth century 
(Kurunmäki and Miller, 2013). Their tempo and extent may vary considerably between 
domains, as the calculative infrastructures of quantification come into contact with existing 
infrastructures and professional enclosures.  And, of course, these processes will vary 
between countries, as ideas and instruments travel. As many have remarked, we live in a 
world made up of assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Deleuze and Parnet, 2002). The 
unity of such assemblages derives only from the co-functioning of their components; the 
relations that are formed among them (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002, p. 69). The instruments that 
enable and enact quantifying, marketising, economising and democratising are always 
already part of such assemblages, multiplicities made up of many heterogeneous aspirations, 
alliances and artefacts.  It is our job to analyse how such assemblages have been formed and 
out of what components, and how particular instruments of quantification link up and 
mediate between domains (or not) and with what effect.  
 
 
 
Quantifying and subjectifying 
 
Finally, to get to grips with the power of numbers it is crucial to attend to the relations 
between quantifying and subjectifying (Foucault, 2001 [1982]; Mennicken and Miller, 2014; 
Miller and Power, 2013). Accounting measures, including prison and hospital performance 
ratings, quantifications of decency, mortality statistics and other performance measures, alter 
the power relations that they shape and are embedded within. They influence the capacities of 
agents, organisations and the connections among them, and they can enable new ways of 
                                                 
12 See http://www.radstats.org.uk/activity/src/, accessed 17 June 2016. 
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acting upon and influencing the actions of individuals. We need to be mindful of how 
instruments of quantification shape and challenge the subjectivities and capacities of public 
service providers and users, and related understandings of personhood and citizenship. Put 
differently, we need to direct attention at how public sector performance measures and the 
classifications contained in them interact with the people classified (Hacking, 2002), how 
they change the ways in which public administrators, on the one hand, and prisoners, patients 
and other public service users on the other hand, are understood, governed, and see 
themselves. In this context, we ought also to attend to the subjectification of collectivities, 
and the creation of new collectivities through quantification. How are numbers involved in 
the organisation of new collectivities, for example the establishment of prison interest groups 
or patient interest groups? What roles do numbers play in the formation of new collective 
identities, for example amongst prisoners or patients (as consumers or active citizens)? What 
roles does quantification play, or might it play, in the articulation of collective protest and 
critique? 
 
We need to distinguish between different modes of subjectifying and disentangle the 
differential effects of quantification, economising and marketising on subjectivity, 
personhood and the possibilities for collective subjects to emerge. Quantification, linked up 
with ideas of economizing, is aimed at producing calculating selves who think and act in 
terms of efficiency, utility calculations, the maximisation of returns, in short, the remaking of 
everything and everyone in the image of “homo oeconomicus” (see also Brown, 2015). 
Quantifying linked up with ideas of marketising seeks to reconstitute subjectivity in terms of 
choice, competition and competitiveness (see also Davies, 2014). Citizens, patients, 
prisoners, and other public service users are turned into consumers, who are to be satisfied 
(see here also the rise of patient and prisoner experience surveys in the NHS and Prison 
Service, respectively). In both cases the calculating selves are enmeshed in networks of 
calculation as both objects and as active participants (Miller, 1992, p. 75). The performance 
of calculating selves – prisoners, prison officers, prison governors, patients, doctors and 
nurses – may be evaluated by others without their knowledge, or against their wishes. 
Prisoners and prison governors may seek to influence prison ratings in their favour, hospital 
managers may be encouraged to tamper with mortality ratios. On the other hand, 
quantification can be turned against programmes of economisation and marketisation (see for 
instance the activities of the Radical Statistics Group). This happens when ruling mechanisms 
of quantification and programmes of governing (for example governing in the name of the 
market or efficiency) are subjected to scrutiny, debate and critique, when forms of disruption 
are sought that go beyond “gaming the numbers”, when numbers become attached to dreams 
and schemes of doing things differently. Such dreams and schemes may be able to produce 
new forms of subjectivity and collectivity, thereby instilling possibilities for critical 
reflexivity into the quantification machine.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above is necessarily preliminary, and we have only been able to allude here and there to 
examples. It may help to summarise our key points. First, we have argued for the plurality of 
forms of quantification, calling for increased attentiveness to the differences between 
quantification, economisation, and marketisation.  Second, we have touched on the thorny 
issue of “democratising” the social sphere, discussing the relations between quantification, 
mediating and democratising. We stressed the ambivalent (politicising and de-politicising) 
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roles of quantification in contemporary democracies and emphasised the need to follow the 
numbers across different sites of production and circulation. We underlined the importance of 
investigating interactions between different quantification regimes and scrutinising the 
interrelations that need to be formed among ideas and instruments if they are to co-function 
within a particular assemblage, and the tracking of the emergence of such assemblages. 
Third, and finally, we attended to the relations between quantifying and subjectifying, how 
quantifying in all its various forms can alter the possibilities for personhood as well as the 
possibilities for collective subjects to emerge. 
 
For those interested in the powers of quantification in all its forms, the challenge now is to 
get to grips with at least some of these questions, without theoretical short-cuts that hinder 
our ability to analyse and chart empirically such powers. We need to better understand who 
we are, what we have become, and who we wish to be.  For quantification, economisation, 
and marketisation are ultimately about our selves.  The calculated management of life that 
Foucault and others have done so much to highlight appears today to be at a critical juncture, 
where even the most utopian and apparently benign projects can quickly become dystopias.  
The quantification machine is not only up and running, but seems to be accelerating at an 
alarming rate, and it is essential that we consider the uses to which it is to be put. 
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